The cerebellum ages more slowly than other body and brain areas

This 2015 UCLA human study used the epigenetic clock methodology to find:

“All brain regions have similar DNAm ages in subjects younger than 80, but brain region becomes an increasingly significant determinant of age acceleration in older subjects. The cerebellum has a lower epigenetic age than other brain regions in older subjects.

To study age acceleration effects in non-brain tissues as well, we profiled a total of 30 tissues of a 112 year old woman. The cerebellum exhibited the lowest (negative) age acceleration effect compared to the remaining 29 other regions. In contrast, bone, bone marrow, and blood exhibit relatively older DNAm ages.”

Limitations included:

  • “While the epigenetic age of blood has been shown to relate to biological age, the same cannot yet be said about brain tissue.
  • Cellular heterogeneity may confound these results since the cerebellum involves distinct cell types.
  • This cross-sectional analysis does not lend itself for dissecting cause and effect relationships.”

The study didn’t determine why the cerebellum was relatively younger. Some hypotheses were:

  • “Our findings suggest that cerebellar DNA is epigenetically more stable and requires less ‘maintenance work.’
  • The cerebellum has a lower metabolic rate than cortex.
  • It has far fewer mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) deletions than cortex especially in older subjects, and it accumulates less oxidative damage to both mtDNA and nuclear DNA than does cortex.”

http://impactaging.com/papers/v7/n5/full/100742.html “The cerebellum ages slowly according to the epigenetic clock”

Observing pain in others had long-lasting brain effects

This 2016 Israeli human study used whole-head magnetoencephalography (MEG) to study pain perception in military veterans:

Our findings demonstrate alterations in pain perception following extreme pain exposure, chart the sequence from automatic to evaluative pain processing, and emphasize the importance of considering past experiences in studying the neural response to others’ states.

Differences in brain activation to ‘pain’ and ‘no pain’ in the PCC [posterior cingulate cortex] emerged only among controls. This suggests that prior exposure to extreme pain alters the typical brain response to pain by blurring the distinction between painful and otherwise identical but nonpainful stimuli, and that this blurring of the ‘pain effect’ stems from increased responses to ‘no pain’ rather than from attenuated response to pain.”


Limitations included:

  • “The pain-exposed participants showed posttraumatic symptoms, which may also be related to the observed alterations in the brain response to pain.
  • We did not include pain threshold measurements. However, the participants’ sensitivity to experienced pain may have had an effect on the processing of observed pain.
  • The regions of interest for the examination of pain processing in the pain-exposed group were defined on the basis of the results identified in the control group.
  • We did not detect pain-related activations in additional regions typically associated with pain perception, such as the anterior insula and ACC. This may be related to differences between the MEG and fMRI neuroimaging approaches.”

The subjects self-administered oxytocin or placebo per the study’s design. However:

“We chose to focus on the placebo condition and to test group differences at baseline only, in light of the recent criticism on underpowered oxytocin administration studies, and thus all following analyses are reported for the placebo condition.”


A few questions:

  1. If observing others’ pain caused “increased responses to ‘no pain’,” wouldn’t the same effect or more be expected from experiencing one’s own pain?
  2. If there’s evidence for item 1, then why aren’t “increased responses to ‘no pain'” of affected people overtly evident in everyday life?
  3. If item 2 is often observed, then what are the neurobiological consequences for affected people’s suppression of “increased responses to ‘no pain’?”
  4. Along with the effects of item 3, what may be behavioral, emotional, and other evidence of this suppressed pain effect?
  5. What would it take for affected people to regain a normal processing of others’ “‘pain’ and ‘no pain’?”

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299546838_Prior_exposure_to_extreme_pain_alters_neural_response_to_pain_in_others “Prior exposure to extreme pain alters neural response to pain in others” Thanks to one of the authors, Ruth Feldman, for providing the full study

The current paradigm of child abuse limits pre-childhood causal research

As an adult, what would be your primary concern if you suspected that your early life had something to do with current problems? Would you be interested in effective treatments for causes of your symptoms?

Such information wasn’t available in this 2016 Miami review of the effects of child abuse. The review laid out the current paradigm mentioned in Grokking an Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) score, one that limits research into pre-childhood causes for later-life symptoms.

The review’s goal was to describe:

“How numerous clinical and basic studies have contributed to establish the now widely accepted idea that adverse early life experiences can elicit profound effects on the development and function of the nervous system.”

The hidden assumptions of almost all of the cited references were that these distant causes could no longer be addressed. Aren’t such assumptions testable today?

As an example, the Discussion section posed the top nine “most pressing unanswered questions related to the neurobiological effects of early life trauma.” In line with the current paradigm, the reviewer assigned “Are the biological consequences of ELS [early life stress] reversible?” into the sixth position.

If the current paradigm encouraged research into treatment of causes, there would probably already be plenty of evidence to demonstrate that directly reducing the source of damage would also reverse damaging effects. There would have been enough studies done so that the generalized question of reversibility wouldn’t be asked.

Aren’t people interested in treatments of originating causes so that their various symptoms don’t keep bubbling up? Why wouldn’t research paradigms be aligned accordingly?


The review also demonstrated how the current paradigm of child abuse misrepresented items like telomere length and oxytocin. Researchers on the bandwagon tend to forget about the principle Einstein expressed as:

“No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong.”

That single experiment for telomere length arrived in 2016 with Using an epigenetic clock to distinguish cellular aging from senescence. The review’s seven citations for telomere length that all had findings “associated with” or “linked to” child abuse should now be viewed in a different light.

The same light shone on oxytocin with Testing the null hypothesis of oxytocin’s effects in humans and Oxytocin research null findings come out of the file drawer. See their references, and decide for yourself whether or not:

“Claimed research findings may often be simply accurate measures of the prevailing bias.”

http://www.cell.com/neuron/fulltext/S0896-6273%2816%2900020-9 “Paradise Lost: The Neurobiological and Clinical Consequences of Child Abuse and Neglect”


This post has somehow become a target for spammers, and I’ve disabled comments. Readers can comment on other posts and indicate that they want their comment to apply here, and I’ll re-enable comments.

Beneficial epigenetic effects of mild stress with social support during puberty

This 2016 Pennsylvania rodent study found:

“Stress in the context of social support experienced over the pubertal window can promote epigenetic reprogramming in the brain to increase resilience to age-related cognitive decline in females.

These findings are actually consistent with previous studies showing that some amount of adversity, or adversity under more favorable circumstances such as social support or a protective gene polymorphism, provides a measure of ‘grit’ in coping with later life challenges.

Our findings provide a unique perspective on this relationship, as they highlight the important link between experience during the pubertal window and cognitive health during aging.”

These researchers made efforts to further investigate causes of unexpected results, such as:

“Peripubertal stress alone did not significantly alter Barnes maze performance in aging compared to aged Controls. Mice that had experienced stress with concurrent social support (CVS + SI) actually performed better than Control aged mice, specifically in learning the reversal task faster.

Peripubertal stress had no effect on corticosterone levels in response to an acute restraint stress or in sensorimotor gating and baseline startle reactivity.”

Their investigations led to epigenetic findings:

“Consistent with our behavioral findings, stress in the context of social interaction resulted in long-term reprogramming of gene expression in the PFC [prefrontal cortex]. While there were no differentially expressed genes between Control and CVS females, there were 88 genes that were significantly different between Control and CVS + SI groups. Of genes that were downregulated, a large portion (23 genes; 35%) were microRNAs.

We found that the PFC transcriptome of CVS + SI aged females was significantly enriched for predicted targets of the 23 microRNAs that were downregulated in the PFC in these mice. This suggests that microRNAs represent a mode of regulation capable of enacting far-reaching programmatic effects, and are a critical epigenetic gene expression regulatory mechanism.”

Applicability to humans was suggested by associations such as:

“A single microRNA can target more than a hundred different mRNA targets, and more than 45,000 conserved microRNA binding sites have been annotated in the 3′ UTR of 60% of human genes.”


A few limitations were noted:

“Given that mice at this age (1 year) are commonly compared to ‘late middle aged’ humans, later aging time points may yield differences in this group. Alternatively, it is possible that there was an effect of peripubertal stress that was not long-lasting due to the mild nature of our chronic stress model.

To include early neglect as a part of the stressor experience, CVS females were weaned one week earlier (PN21) than Control and CVS + SI mice. Addition of stress of this earlier weaning likely poses a significant contribution to programming of the PFC.”

One of the study coauthors was also a coauthor of:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4870871/ “Peripubertal stress with social support promotes resilience in the face of aging”

A review that inadvertently showed how memory paradigms prevented relevant research

This 2016 Swiss review of enduring memories demonstrated what happens when scientists’ reputations and paychecks interfered with them recognizing new research and evidence in their area but outside their paradigm: “A framework containing the basic assumptions, ways of thinking, and methodology that are commonly accepted by members of a scientific community.”

A. Most of the cited references were from decades ago that established these paradigms of enduring memories. Fine, but the research these paradigms excluded was also significant.

B. All of the newer references were continuations of established paradigms. For example, a 2014 study led by one of the reviewers found:

“Successful reconsolidation-updating paradigms for recent memories fail to attenuate remote (i.e., month-old) ones.

Recalling remote memories fails to induce histone acetylation-mediated plasticity.”

The researchers elected to pursue a workaround of the memory reconsolidation paradigm when the need for a new paradigm of enduring memories directly confronted them!

C. None of the reviewers’ calls for further investigations challenged existing paradigms. For example, when the reviewers suggested research into epigenetic regulation of enduring memories, they somehow found it best to return to 1984, a time when dedicated epigenetics research had barely begun:

“Whether memories might indeed be ‘coded in particular stretches of chromosomal DNA’ as originally proposed by Crick [in 1984] and if so what the enzymatic machinery behind such changes might be remain unclear. In this regard, cell population-specific studies are highly warranted.”


Two examples of relevant research the review failed to consider:

1. A study that provided evidence for basic principles of Primal Therapy went outside existing paradigms to research state-dependent memories:

“If a traumatic event occurs when these extra-synaptic GABA receptors are activated, the memory of this event cannot be accessed unless these receptors are activated once again.

It’s an entirely different system even at the genetic and molecular level than the one that encodes normal memories.”

What impressed me about that study was the obvious nature of its straightforward experimental methods. Why hadn’t other researchers used the same methods decades ago? Doing so could have resulted in dozens of informative follow-on study variations by now, which is my point in Item A. above.

2. A relevant but ignored 2015 French study What can cause memories that are accessible only when returning to the original brain state? which supported state-dependent memories:

“Posttraining/postreactivation treatments induce an internal state, which becomes encoded with the memory, and should be present at the time of testing to ensure a successful retrieval.”


The review also showed the extent to which historical memory paradigms depend on the subjects’ emotional memories. When it comes to human studies, though, designs almost always avoid studying emotional memories.

It’s clearly past time to Advance science by including emotion in research.

http://www.hindawi.com/journals/np/2016/3425908/ “Structural, Synaptic, and Epigenetic Dynamics of Enduring Memories”

Epigenetic effects of diet, and reversing DNA methylation

This 2015 French review focused on:

“The role of maternal health and nutrition in the initiation and progression of metabolic and other disorders.

The effects of various in utero exposures and maternal nutritional status may have different effects on the epigenome. However, critical windows of exposure that seem to exist during development need to be better defined.

The epigenome can be considered as an interface between the genome and the environment that is central to the generation of phenotypes and their stability throughout the life course.”

The reviewer used the term “transgenerational” to refer to effects that were more appropriately termed parental or intergenerational. Per the definition in A review of epigenetic transgenerational inheritance of reproductive disease, for the term to apply there needed to be evidence in at least the next 2 male and/or 3 female generations of:

“Altered epigenetic information between generations in the absence of continued environmental exposure.”

The review had separate sections for animal and human studies.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4663595/ “Impact of Maternal Diet on the Epigenome during In Utero Life and the Developmental Programming of Diseases in Childhood and Adulthood”


I arrived at the above review as a result of it citing the 2014 Harvard Reversing DNA Methylation: Mechanisms, Genomics, and Biological Functions. I’ll quote a few items from that review’s informative “Role of DNA demethylation in neural development” section:

“Distinct parts of mammalian brains, including frontal cortex, hippocampus, and cerebellum, all exhibit age-dependent acquisition of 5hmC [an oxidized derivative of 5mC [methylation of the fifth position of cytosine]].

In fact, the genome of mature neurons in adult central nervous system contains the highest level of 5hmC of any mammalian cell-type (~40% as abundant as 5mC in Purkinje neurons in cerebellum). These observations indicate that 5mC oxidation and potentially DNA demethylation may be functionally important for neuronal differentiation and maturation processes.

A comprehensive base-resolution analyses of 5mC and 5hmC in mammalian frontal cortex in both fetal and adult stages indicate that non-CpG methylation (mCH) and CpG hydroxymethylation (hCG) drastically build up in cortical neurons after birth, coinciding with the peak of synaptogenesis and synaptic pruning in the cortex. This study demonstrated that mCH could become a dominant form of cytosine modifications in adult brains, accounting for 53% in adult human cortical neuronal genome.

In mature neurons, intragenic mCH is preferentially enriched at inactive non-neuronal lineage-specific genes, indicating a role in negative regulation of the associated transcripts. By contrast, genic hCG is positively correlated with gene expression levels.”

What’s the underlying question for every brain study to answer?

Is the underlying question for every brain study to answer:

  • How do our brains internally represent the external world?

Is it:

  • How did we learn what we know?
  • How do we forget or disregard what we’ve learned?
  • What keeps us from acquiring and learning newer or better information?

How about:

  • What affects how we pay attention to our environments?
  • How do our various biochemical states affect our perceptions, learning, experiences, and behavior?
  • How do these factors in turn affect our biology?

Or maybe:

  • Why do we do what we do?
  • How is our behavior affected by our experiences?
  • How did we become attracted and motivated toward what we like?
  • How do we develop expectations?
  • Why do we avoid certain situations?

Not to lose sight of:

  • How do the contexts affect all of the above?
  • What happens over time to affect all of the above?

This 2015 UCLA paper reviewed the above questions from the perspective of Pavlovian conditioning:

“The common definition of Pavlovian conditioning, that via repeated pairings of a neutral stimulus with a stimulus that elicits a reflex the neutral stimulus acquires the ability to elicit that the reflex, is neither accurate nor reflective of the richness of Pavlovian conditioning. Rather, Pavlovian conditioning is the way we learn about dependent relationships between stimuli.

Pavlovian conditioning is one of the few areas in biology in which there is direct experimental evidence of biological fitness.”


The most important question unanswered by the review was:

  • How can its information be used to help humans?

How can Pavlovian conditioning answer: What can a human do about the thoughts, feelings, behavior, epigenetic effects – the person – the phenotype – that they’ve been shaped into?

One example of the unanswered question: the review pointed out in a section about fear extinction that this process doesn’t involve unlearning. Fear extinction instead inhibits the symptoms of fear response. The fear memory is still intact, awaiting some other context to be reactivated and expressed.

How can this information be used to help humans?

  • Is inhibiting the symptoms and leaving the fear memory in place costless with humans?
  • Or does this practice have both potential and realized adverse effects?
  • Where’s the human research on methods that may directly address a painful emotional memory?

One relevant hypothesis of Dr. Arthur Janov’s Primal Therapy is that a person continues to be their conditioned self until they address the sources of their pain. A corollary is that efforts to relieve symptoms seldom address causes.

How could it be otherwise? A problem isn’t cured by ameliorating its effects.

http://cshperspectives.cshlp.org/content/8/1/a021717.full “The Origins and Organization of Vertebrate Pavlovian Conditioning”

Empathy, value, pain, control: Psychological functions of the human striatum

This 2016 US human study found:

“A link between existing data on the anatomical and physiological characteristics of striatal regions and psychological functions.

Because we did not limit our metaanalysis to studies that specifically targeted striatal function, our results extend previous knowledge of the involvement of the striatum in reward-related decision-making tasks, and provide a detailed functional map of regional specialization for diverse psychological functions, some of which are sometimes thought of as being the exclusive domain of the PFC [prefrontal cortex].”

The analysis led to dividing the striatum into five segments:

Ventral striatum (VS):

  • Stimulus Value
  • Terms such as “reward,” “losses,” and “craving”
  • The most representative study reported that monetary and social rewards activate overlapping regions within the VS.
  • Together with the above finding of a reliable coactivation with OFC [orbitofrontal cortex] and ventromedial PFC, this finding suggests a broad involvement of this area in representing stimulus value and related stimulus-driven motivational states.

Anterior caudate (Ca) Nucleus:

  • Incentive Behavior
  • Terms such as “grasping,” “reaching,” and “reinforcement”
  • The most representative study reported a stronger blood-oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response in this region during trials in which participants had a chance of winning or losing money in a card guessing game, in comparison to trials where participants merely received feedback about the accuracy of their guess.
  • This result suggests a role in evaluating the value of different actions, contrasting with the above role of the VS in evaluating the value of stimuli.

Posterior putamen (Pp):

  • Sensorimotor Processes
  • Terms such as “foot,” “noxious,” and “taste”
  • The most representative study reported activation of this region in response to painful stimulation at the back of the left hand and foot of participants. Anatomically, the most reliable and specific coactivation is with sensorimotor cortices, and the posterior and midinsula and operculum (secondary somatosensory cortex SII) in particular, some parts of which are specifically associated with pain.
  • Together, these findings suggest a broad involvement of this area in sensorimotor functions, including aspects of their affective qualities.

Anterior putamen (Pa):

  • Social- and Language-Related Functions
  • Terms such as “read,” “vocal,” and “empathic”
  • The most representative study partially supports a role of this area in social- and language-related functions; it reported a stronger activation of the Pa in experienced singers, but not when novices were singing.
  • It is coactivated with frontal areas anterior to the ones coactivated with the Pp, demonstrating topography in frontostriatal associations. These anterior regions have been implicated in language processes.

Posterior caudate (Cp) Nucleus:

  • Executive Functions
  • Terms such as “causality,” “rehearsal,” and “arithmetic”
  • The representative study reported this region to be part of a network that included dorsolateral PFC and ACC, which supported inhibitory control and task set-shifting.
  • These results suggest a broad, and previously underappreciated, role for the Cp in cognitive control.

The authors presented comparisons of the above striatal segments with other analyses of striatal zones.


One of the coauthors was the lead researcher of the 2015 Advance science by including emotion in research. The current study similarly used a coactivation view rather than a connectivity paradigm of:

“Inferring striatal function indirectly via psychological functions of connected cortical regions.”

Another of the coauthors was a developer of the system used by the current study and by The function of the dorsal ACC is to monitor pain in survival contexts, and he provided feedback to those authors regarding proper use of the system.


The researchers’ “unbiased, data-driven approach” had to work around the cortical biases evident in many of the 5,809 human imaging studies analyzed. The authors referred to the biases in statements such as:

“The majority of studies investigating these psychological functions report activity preferentially in cortical areas, except for studies investigating reward-related and motor functions.”

The methods and results of research with cortical biases influenced the study’s use of:

“Word frequencies of psychological terms in the full text of studies, rather than a detailed analysis of psychological tasks and statistical contrasts.”

http://www.pnas.org/content/113/7/1907.full “Regional specialization within the human striatum for diverse psychological functions”

Does vasopressin increase mutually beneficial cooperation?

This 2016 German human study found:

“Intranasal administration of arginine vasopressin (AVP), a hormone that regulates mammalian social behaviors such as monogamy and aggression, increases humans’ tendency to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation.

AVP increases humans’ willingness to cooperate. That increase is not due to an increase in the general willingness to bear risks or to altruistically help others.”


One limitation of the study was that the subjects were all males, ages 19-32. The study’s title was “human risky cooperative behavior” while omitting subjects representing the majority of humanity.

Although the researchers claimed brain effects from vasopressin administration, they didn’t provide direct evidence for the internasally administered vasopressin in the subjects’ brains. A similar point was made about studies of vasopressin’s companion neuropeptide, oxytocin, in Testing the null hypothesis of oxytocin’s effects in humans.

A third limitation was that although the researchers correlated brain activity with social behaviors, they didn’t carry out all of the tests necessary to demonstrate the claimed “novel causal evidence for a biological factor underlying cooperation.” Per Confusion may be misinterpreted as altruism and prosocial behavior, the researchers additionally needed to:

“When attempting to measure social behaviors, it is not sufficient to merely record decisions with behavioral consequences and then infer social preferences. One also needs to manipulate these consequences to test whether this affects the behavior.”

http://www.pnas.org/content/113/8/2051.full “Vasopressin increases human risky cooperative behavior”

The effects of imposing helplessness

This 2016 New York rodent study found:

“By using unbiased and whole-brain imaging techniques, we uncover a number of cortical and subcortical brain structures that have lower activity in the animals showing helplessness than in those showing resilience following the LH [learned helplessness] procedure. We also identified the LC [locus coeruleus] as the sole subcortical area that had enhanced activity in helpless animals compared with resilient ones.

Some of the brain areas identified in this study – such as areas in the mPFC [medial prefrontal cortex], hippocampus, and amygdala – have been previously implicated in clinical depression or depression-like behavior in animal models. We also identified novel brain regions previously not associated with helplessness. For example, the OT [olfactory tubercle], an area involved in odor processing as well as high cognitive functions including reward processing, and the Edinger–Westphal nucleus containing centrally projecting neurons implicated in stress adaptation.

The brains of helpless animals are locked in a highly stereotypic pathological state.”

Concerning the study’s young adult male subjects:

“To achieve a subsequent detection of neuronal activity related to distinct behavioral responses, we used the c-fosGFP transgenic mice expressing c-FosGFP under the control of a c-fos promoter. The expression of the c-fosGFP transgene has been previously validated to faithfully represent endogenous c-fos expression.

Similar to wild-type mice, approximately 22% (32 of 144) of the c-fosGFP mice showed helplessness.”

The final sentence of the Introduction section:

“Our study..supports the view that defining neuronal circuits underlying stress-induced depression-like behavior in animal models can help identify new targets for the treatment of depression.”


Helplessness is both a learned behavior and a cumulative set of experiences during every human’s early life. Therapeutic approaches to detrimental effects of helplessness can be different with humans than with rodents in that we can address causes.

The researchers categorized activity in brain circuits as causal in the Discussion section:

“Future studies aimed at manipulating these identified neural changes are required for determining whether they are causally related to the expression of helplessness or resilience.”

Studying whether or not activity in brain circuits induces helplessness in rodents may not inform us about causes of helplessness in humans. Our experiences are often the ultimate causes of helplessness effects. Many of our experiential “neural changes” are only effects, as demonstrated by this and other studies’ induced phenotypes such as “Learned Helplessness” and “Prenatally Restraint Stressed.”

Weren’t the researchers satisfied that the study confirmed what was known and made new findings? Why attempt to extend animal models that only treat effects to humans, as implied in the Introduction above and in the final sentence of the Discussion section:

“Future studies aimed at elucidating the specific roles of these regions in the pathophysiology of depression as well as serve as neural circuit-based targets for the development of novel therapeutics.”

http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fncir.2016.00003/full “Whole-Brain Mapping of Neuronal Activity in the Learned Helplessness Model of Depression” (Thanks to A Paper a Day Keeps the Scientist Okay)

Advance science by including emotion in research

This 2015 analysis of emotion studies found:

“Emotion categories [fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and happiness] are not contained within any one region or system, but are represented as configurations across multiple brain networks.

For example, among other systems, information diagnostic of emotion category was found in both large, multi-functional cortical networks and in the thalamus, a small region composed of functionally dedicated sub-nuclei.

The dataset consists of activation foci from 397 fMRI and PET [positron emission tomography] studies of emotion published between 1990 and 2011.”

From the fascinating Limitations section:

“Our analyses reflect the composition of the studies available in the literature, and are subject to testing and reporting biases on the part of authors. This is particularly true for the amygdala (e.g., the activation intensity for negative emotions may be over-represented in the amygdala given the theoretical focus on fear and related negative states). Other interesting distinctions were encoded in the thalamus and cerebellum, which have not received the theoretical attention that the amygdala has and are likely to be bias-free.

Some regions—particularly the brainstem—are likely to be much more important for understanding and diagnosing emotion than is apparent in our findings, because neuroimaging methods are only now beginning to focus on the brainstem with sufficient spatial resolution and artifact-suppression techniques.

We should not be too quick to dismiss findings in ‘sensory processing’ areas, etc., as methodological artifacts. Emotional responses may be inherently linked to changes in sensory and motor cortical processes that contribute to the emotional response.

The results we present here provide a co-activation based view of emotion representation. Much of the information processing in the brain that creates co-activation may not relate to direct neural connectivity at all, but rather to diffuse modulatory actions (e.g., dopamine and neuropeptide release, much of which is extrasynaptic and results in volume transmission). Thus, the present results do not imply direct neural connectivity, and may be related to diffuse neuromodulatory actions as well as direct neural communication.”


Why did the researchers use only 397 fMRI and PET studies? Why weren’t there tens or hundreds of times more candidate studies from which to select?

The relative paucity of candidate emotion studies demonstrated the prevalence of other researchers’ biases for cortical brain areas. The lead researcher of the current study was a coauthor of the 2016 Empathy, value, pain, control: Psychological functions of the human striatum, whose researchers mentioned that even their analyses of 5,809 human imaging studies was hampered by other imaging-studies researchers’ cortical biases.

Functional MRI signals depend on the changes in blood flow that follow changes in brain activity. Study designers intentionally limit their findings when they scan brain areas and circuits that are possibly activated by human emotions, yet exclude emotional content that may activate these areas and circuits.

Here are a few examples of limited designs that led to limited findings when there was the potential for so much more:

It’s well past time to change these practices now in the current year.


This study provided many methodological tests that should be helpful for research that includes emotion. It showed that there aren’t impenetrable barriers – other than popular memes, beliefs, and ingrained dogmas – to including emotional content in studies.

Including emotional content may often be appropriate and informative, with the resultant findings advancing science. Here are a few recent studies that did so:

http://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.1004066 “A Bayesian Model of Category-Specific Emotional Brain Responses”

Chronic pain causes epigenetic changes in the brain and immune system

This 2015 Canadian rodent study by McGill researchers found:

“The critical involvement of DNA methylation in chronic pain. We show that in the PFC [prefrontal cortex], a brain region strongly implicated in chronic pain, a stunning number of promoters [control gene expression] are differentially methylated 9 months after injury. These changes are distant both in time and space from the original injury.

The changes in DNA methylation are highly organized in functional pathways that have been implicated in pain such as dysregulation of dopaminergic, glutamatergic, opioid and serotoninergic systems and important signaling and inflammatory pathways.

Genome-wide DNA methylation modifications of T cells [circulating white blood cells that control immune response] are also associated with nerve injury.

Most of the promoters (72%) identified as differentially methylated in T cells after nerve injury were also affected in the brain. While the methylation profiles in some of these modules were affected in the same direction in the brain and the T cells, others went in opposite direction. This is consistent with the idea that the brain and the immune system play different roles in chronic pain.

These data suggest that:

  • Persistent pain is associated with broad and highly organized organism-wide changes in DNA methylation, including two critical biological systems: the central nervous and immune systems.
  • This work also provides a possible mechanistic explanation for commonly observed comorbidities observed in chronic pain (i.e anxiety, depression).
  • Finally, the sheer magnitude of the impact of chronic pain, particularly in the prefrontal cortex, illustrates the profound impact that living with chronic pain exerts on an individual.”

http://www.nature.com/articles/srep19615 “Overlapping signatures of chronic pain in the DNA methylation landscape of prefrontal cortex and peripheral T cells”


The news coverage focused on how the study’s findings may lead to non-invasive DNA methylation measurements of chronic pain as well as treatments of the effects. I’d argue that the researchers’ concluding statement of the Discussion section deserved the most focus:

“Beyond the example of chronic pain, the robust and highly organized DNA methylation changes seen here in response to nerve injury provides some of the strongest evidence to date that experience effects DNA methylation landscapes at large distances in time and space.”

The study provided “some of the strongest evidence to date” that experiences caused widespread, long-lasting epigenetic changes. Given experiences’ etiologic functions, research with working hypotheses that experiences may also reverse epigenetic changes should be green-lighted.

“DNA methylation landscapes at large distances in time and space” warrant systematic examination of how experiential epigenetic changes during early life may be reversed by experiential therapies later in life. In the current year, there’s sufficient evidence for modifying research goals to primarily address causes, not just effects.

Confusion may be misinterpreted as altruism and prosocial behavior

This 2015 Oxford human study of altruism found:

“Division of people into distinct social types relies on the assumption that an individual’s decisions in public-goods games can be used to accurately measure their social preferences. Specifically, that greater contributions to the cooperative project in the game reflect a greater valuing of the welfare of others, termed “prosociality.”

Individuals behave in the same way, irrespective of whether they are playing computers or humans, even when controlling for beliefs. Therefore, the previously observed differences in human behavior do not need to be explained by variation in the extent to which individuals care about fairness or the welfare of others.

Conditional cooperators, who approximately match the contributions of their groupmates, misunderstand the game. Answering the standard control questions correctly does not guarantee understanding.

We find no evidence that there is a subpopulation of players that understand the game and have prosocial motives toward human players.

These results cast doubt on certain experimental methods and demonstrate that a common assumption in behavioral economics experiments, that choices reveal motivations, will not necessarily hold.

When attempting to measure social behaviors, it is not sufficient to merely record decisions with behavioral consequences and then infer social preferences. One also needs to manipulate these consequences to test whether this affects the behavior.”

The researchers are evolutionary biologists who had made similar points in previous studies. They addressed possible confounders in the study and supporting information, and provided complete details in the appendix. For example, regarding reciprocity:

“Communication was forbidden, and we provided no feedback on earnings or the behavior of groupmates. This design prevents signaling, reciprocity, and learning and therefore minimizes any order effects.

It might also be argued that people playing with computers cannot help behaving as if they were playing with humans. Such ingraining of behavior would suggest a major problem for the way in which economic games have been used to measure social preferences. In particular, behavior would reflect everyday expectations from the real world, such as reputation concerns or the possibility of reciprocity, rather than the setup of the game and the true consequences of choices.”


Some of the news coverage missed the lead point of how:

“Economic experiments are often used to study if humans altruistically value the welfare of others.

These results cast doubt on certain experimental methods and demonstrate that a common assumption in behavioral economics experiments, that choices reveal motivations, will not necessarily hold.”

Here are several expressions of beliefs in one news coverage article where the author attempted to flip the discussion to cast doubt on the study. It was along the lines of “There’s something wrong with this study (that I haven’t thoroughly read) because [insert aspersion about sample size, etc.]” What motivates such reflexive behavior?


This study should inform social behavior studies that draw conclusions from flawed experimental designs. For example, both:

based their findings on a video game of popping balloons. Neither study properly interpreted their subjects’ decisions per the current study’s recommendation:

“When attempting to measure social behaviors, it is not sufficient to merely record decisions with behavioral consequences and then infer social preferences. One also needs to manipulate these consequences to test whether this affects the behavior.”

http://www.pnas.org/content/113/5/1291.full “Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments”


This post has somehow become a target for spammers, and I’ve disabled comments. Readers can comment on other posts and indicate that they want their comment to apply here, and I’ll re-enable comments.

Lifelong effects of stress

A 2016 commentary A trilogy of glucocorticoid receptor actions that included two 2015 French rodent studies started out:

Glucocorticoids (GCs) belong to a class of endogenous, stress-stimulated steroid hormones. They have wide ranging physiologic effects capable of impacting metabolism, immunity, development, stress, cognition, and arousal.

GCs exert their cellular effects by binding to the GC receptor (GR), one of a 48-member (in humans) nuclear receptor superfamily of ligand-activated transcription factors.”

The French studies were exceedingly technical. The first GR SUMOylation and formation of an SUMO-SMRT/NCoR1-HDAC3 repressing complex is mandatory for GC-induced IR nGRE-mediated transrepression:

“GCs acting through binding to the GR are peripheral effectors of circadian and stress-related homeostatic functions fundamental for survival.

Unveils, at the molecular level, the mechanisms that underlie the GC-induced GR direct transrepression function mediated by the evolutionary conserved inverted repeated negative response element. This knowledge paves the way to the elucidation of the functions of the GR at the submolecular levels and to the future educated design and screening of drugs, which could be devoid of undesirable debilitating effects on prolonged GC therapy.”

The companion study Glucocorticoid-induced tethered transrepression requires SUMOylation of GR and formation of a SUMO-SMRT/NCoR1-HDAC3 repressing complex stated:

“GCs have been widely used to combat inflammatory and allergic disorders. However, multiple severe undesirable side effects associated with long-term GC treatments, as well as induction of glucocorticoid resistance associated with such treatments, limit their therapeutic usefulness.”

Even when researchers study causes, they often justify their efforts in terms of outcomes that address effects. Is an etiologic advancement in science somehow unsatisfactory in and of itself?


Once in a while I get a series of personal revelations while reading scientific publications. Paradoxically, understanding aspects of myself has seldom been sufficient to address historical problems.

Thoughts are only where some of the effects of problems show up, and clarifying my understanding can – at most – tamp down these effects. The causes are elsewhere, and addressing them at the source is what ultimately needs to happen.

A few glucocorticoid-related items to ponder:

  • How has stress impacted my life? When and where did it start?
  • Why do I feel wonderful after taking prednisone or other anti-inflammatories? What may be the originating causes of such effects?
  • Why have prolonged periods of my life been characterized by muted responses to stress? How did I get that way?
  • Have I really understood why I’ve reflexively put myself into stressful situations? What will break me out of that habit?
  • Why do the feelings I experience while under stressful situations feel familiar? Does my unconsciousness of their origins have something to do with “homeostatic functions fundamental for survival?”
  • Why haven’t I noticed that symptoms of stress keep showing up in my life? There are “physiologic effects capable of impacting metabolism, immunity,” etc. but I don’t do something about it?
  • How else may stress impact my biology? Brain functioning? Ideas and beliefs? Behavior?

What was not, is not, and will never be

Neuroskeptic’s blog post Genetic Testing for Autism as an Existential Question related the story of “A Sister, a Father and a Son: Autism, Genetic Testing, and Impossible Decisions.”

“I decided to put the question to my sister, Maria. Although she is autistic, she is of high intelligence.

Maria was excited to be an aunt soon, and was willing to do what she could to help my baby – even if what she was helping with was to avoid her own condition.

She is high enough functioning to know some of what she’s missing in life, and has longed her entire life to be “normal.” If she could save her niece or nephew some of the pain and awkwardness her condition had caused her, she was willing to help.”

In the concluding paragraph:

“What struck me about this story is the way in which the prospect of the genetic test confronted Maria with a very personal decision: will you do something that might help prevent someone else becoming like you?

Isn’t this very close to the ultimate existential question: all things considered, would you wish to live your life over again?”


Aren’t the majority of humans also “high enough functioning to know some of what she’s missing in life?”

Aren’t our feelings of what we’re missing one of the impetuses for us to have also “longed her entire life to be normal?”

This feeling was aired in Dr. Arthur Janov’s blog post What a Waste:

“What it was, was the feeling of great loss, something missing that could never again be duplicated.

It was no love where it could have been the opposite if the parent’s gates could have been open. But it could not be because that would have meant terrible pain and suffering for them; and their whole neurologic system militated against any conscious-awareness.”


We long for what was and is impossible:

  • For many of us, the impossibilities of having normal lives started with prenatal epigenetic changes.
  • Our experiences of our postnatal environment prompted us into adapting to its people, places, and contents. These neurological, biological, and behavioral adaptations were sometimes long-lasting deviations from developmental norms.
  • Other genetic factors combined with the above to largely make us who we were and are.

Our longing for an impossible-to-reconstruct life doesn’t go away.

We often may not be aware of our longing for what “could not be” and of its extensive impacts. Such feelings impel us into many hundreds of ideas, hundreds of beliefs, and hundreds of behaviors, a sample of which were referred to above:

  • Behaviors to “do something that might help prevent someone else becoming like you;”
  • Ideas such as existential philosophy; and
  • Beliefs that manifest the “wish to live your life over again.”

Spending our time on these ideas, beliefs, and behaviors won’t ameliorate their motivating causes. Our efforts distance us from our truths, with real consequences: a wasted life.

What keeps us from understanding our reality? I invite readers to investigate Dr. Arthur Janov’s Primal Therapy for effective therapeutic approaches.