Reflections on my four-year anniversary of spine surgery

At age 55, I found out that I’d suffered for maybe 45 to 50 years from a childhood injury, and I didn’t know anything about it. It still seems unbelievable to me that I was physically ill for decades before I received a diagnosis.

As explained to me by two surgeons, the cause of my spondylolisthesis between L5 and S1 was a sudden injury sometime between ages 5 and 10. Here’s a further explanation:

“In children, spondylolisthesis usually occurs between the fifth bone in the lower back (lumbar vertebra) and the first bone in the sacrum (pelvis) area. It is often due to a birth defect in that area of the spine or sudden injury (acute trauma).

Other causes of spondylolisthesis include bone diseases, traumatic fractures, and stress fractures (commonly seen in gymnasts). Certain sport activities, such as gymnastics, weight lifting, and football, put a great deal of stress on the bones in the lower back. They also require that the athlete constantly overstretch (hyperextend) the spine.”

I played a lot of baseball when I was a kid growing up in Miami. I didn’t suffer from a birth defect or bone disease, play football before I was a teenager, do gymnastics, or lift weights.

I don’t remember a specific “sudden injury (acute trauma)” per the above explanation. Maybe I incurred the acute trauma that started my spondylolisthesis sliding into bases playing baseball. Maybe I incurred it playing in the other rough-and-tumble activities that I did as a boy.


Please stop at the first hint of any pain that you feel while reading the rest of this post. I don’t want to cause you pain.

I re-experienced while in Primal Therapy a day when I was seven or eight years old. A most exhilarating day, one that filled me with light and joy.

What brought on my elevated mood? It was the day I finally ran faster than my father did, and he couldn’t catch me to give me a beating as I ran out of the house.

My father never beat me on the sidewalk, the street, or the front yard anyway. That would make the abuse public.

My father’s job was assistant principal/dean of boys at West Miami Junior High School. He whipped boys with a thick belt or paddled them daily as part of his job requirements.

My father kept a wooden paddle with holes in it at home. For me.

I don’t remember that my three siblings ever received a paddling or belting, although they were spanked. I’ve remembered while in Primal Therapy that my younger sister and brother were spanked for crying.

I re-experienced the dread of waiting (in an exact place with visual details), waiting for my father to come home to administer a spanking or belting or paddling to me for some “transgression” my mother observed. She had dozens of rules of conduct for her children.

I re-experienced my early childhood feelings that my father’s punishments depended more on my mother’s mood than on what I did.

I re-experienced my early childhood feelings that I didn’t deserve the beatings. I didn’t deserve any beatings, not one!

My father continued, though, until I was around age 11 or so. I’m sure that the beatings were a factor in how I felt at age 12:

Suicidal. Needing to escape from my life.

When I was a child, I needed my parents’ love.

I re-experienced many times while in Primal Therapy the overwhelming hopelessness, helplessness, worthlessness, and betrayal when the people I needed to love me were cruel to me instead.


My parents knew what they did was wrong. Neither one of them ever told me that, though.

My father never apologized for beating me so much before he died 19 years ago. Even before he retired, 17 years before he died, the Miami-Dade County public school system stopped him and the rest of their employees from spanking, whipping, beating, and paddling children.

What could he even tell me to take away those experiences?

  • That he beat me as a child because he himself was beaten as a child?
  • That he couldn’t help it?
  • That how he and my mother frequently went out of their way to help me along in life after my childhood somehow made up for the beatings?

I’m certain that my father was beaten as a child. I bring this up not as a defense for what he did, but as part of my history, too.

It wasn’t enough for my father’s mother to beat me while she was babysitting my siblings and me at our parents’ house. I re-experienced crying as a five-year old when I was required to go cut off palm fronds from the tree in front of our house for her to use as a switch, and bring them to her.

It was a mark of my grandmother’s cruelty that she threatened to beat me with a broom handle when I tried to not participate in my own torment. I re-experienced exact places of my legs where she switched me with the palm fronds, giving me even more when I cried during the punishment.


These wounds left scars that haven’t gone away.

Run your hand down your spine until you reach the top of your sacrum. That’s the area on which I had surgery four years ago, where I now have a titanium cage, replacement disc, and two rods to keep the area stable.

I received a lot of beatings pretty close to that area. Maybe my boyhood activities didn’t cause the “sudden injury (acute trauma).”


I write frankly about my parents because that’s my history: the realities of who they were.

And the realities of who I needed them to be.

I express it because getting well has to address reality.

From Dr. Arthur Janov’s book, Primal Healing, page 133:

“Another cognitive technique is to help the patient understand and forgive his parents. ‘After all, your parents did the best they could. They had a pretty tough childhood too.’ ‘Oh yes, I understand. They did have it tough and I do forgive’ comes forth from the left side. Still, of course, the right side is crying out its needs and its pain, and will go on with its silent scream for the rest of our lives.

There is no way around need.

‘Forgiveness’ is an idea that has no place in therapy.

We are not here to pardon parents; we are here to address the needs of patients, and what the lack of fulfillment did to them.

I regret to say that much of current therapy and particularly cognitive therapy is about a moral position; well hidden, couched in psychological jargon, but, at bottom, moralizing. The therapist becomes the arbiter of correct behavior.

After all, the therapist is trying to change the patient’s behavior toward some preconceived goal. That goal has a sequestered moral position.”

A study on alpha brain waves and visual processing that had limited findings

This 2015 Wisconsin human study found:

“Forming predictions about when a stimulus will appear can bias the phase of ongoing alpha-band oscillations toward an optimal phase for visual processing, and may thus serve as a mechanism for the top-down control of visual processing guided by temporal predictions.”

The researchers measured delta (1-4 Hz), theta (4-7 Hz), alpha (9-13 Hz), and low beta (15-20 Hz) brain waves. Their findings applied only to the alpha band in their experimental tasks, which excluded emotional content.

Brain waves studies such as Are hippocampal place cells controlled by theta brain waves from grid cells? and Research that identifies the source of generating gamma brain waves established different experimental conditions that elicited brain waves in non-alpha frequency bands. Such studies may have been relevant to further explain this study’s negative findings.

Visual perception studies such as We are attuned to perceive what our brains predict will be rewarding and Our long-term memory usually selects what we pay closer visual attention to provided insight into possible causes for the observed effects. It may have provided additional findings if the researchers of this study were also interested in causal factors that affected visual processing.

Other studies on visual perception such as The amygdala is where we integrate our perception of human facial emotion provided reasons to not exclude emotional content in brain studies. The current study’s researchers claimed that they provided insights relevant to neurological disorders by stating:

“Because forming the appropriate sensory predictions can have a large impact on our visual experiences and visually guided behaviors, a mechanism thought to be disrupted in certain neurological conditions like autism and schizophrenia, an understanding of the neural basis of these predictions is critical.”

However, I didn’t see that the researchers provided such an understanding since their experimental designs excluded emotional content. I wonder what the reviewer saw that justified this Significance section statement.

http://www.pnas.org/content/112/27/8439.full “Top-down control of the phase of alpha-band oscillations as a mechanism for temporal prediction”

Do scientists have to perpetuate memes in order to keep their jobs?

I was disgusted by this 2015 Korean human study.

Is the current state of science such that researchers won’t be funded unless there’s an implicit guarantee that their studies will produce politically correct findings? It seemed that the primary reason for the study’s main finding of:

“Neural markers reflecting individual differences in human prosociality”

was to perpetuate that non-causal, non-explanatory meme.

Per If research treats “Preexisting individual differences” as a black box, how can it find causes for stress and depression? it wasn’t sufficient in 2015 to pretend that there are no early-life causes for the observed behavior and fMRI scan results of the subjects. Such a pretense leads to the follow-on pretense that later-life consequences are not effects, but are instead, a “mystery” due to “individual differences.”

The researchers asserted:

“Our present findings shed some light on the mystery of human altruism.”

Weren’t the findings of the People who donated a kidney to a stranger have a larger amygdala 2014 study of extraordinary altruists big enough clues for these researchers to feature the amygdala in the fMRI scans?

The main experiment had the female, college student, right-handed subjects try to “reduce the duration of exposure to stressful noise.” Why weren’t brain areas that are especially susceptible to stress like the hippocampus featured in the fMRI scans?

The secondary reason for the study seemed to be to perpetuate the harmful “self-sacrifice = good, individuality = bad” meme.

The main reason this meme is harmful is that it condones a subset of people’s unconscious act outs. People are encouraged to avoid conscious awareness both of who they really are and of what drives their feelings, thoughts, and actions.

Despite not asking the subjects directly about either their motivations or their histories, these researchers asserted that the study demonstrated:

“The automatic and intuitive nature of prosocial motivation.”

What was largely observed were the subjects’ unconscious act outs, not some higher-order functions as the researchers mischaracterized them.

Similar to Who benefits when research promotes a meme of self-sacrifice? I suspect that a major motivation behind scientific justification for memes like the self-sacrifice promoted by this study is to rush people past what really happened in their lives.

I wonder what value we would place on the “social norms internalized within an individual” if we felt and honestly understood our real history.


This study and the Do you know a stranger’s emotional motivations for smiling? study had the same reviewer, and shared several of the burden-of-proof problems. Both studies demonstrated a lack of researcher interest in finding causes for the observed effects.

What was the agenda with these researchers and the reviewer? Why would the researchers glorify factors that cause difficulties when one tries to live a life of one’s own choosing?

http://www.pnas.org/content/112/25/7851.full “Spatial gradient in value representation along the medial prefrontal cortex reflects individual differences in prosociality”

An inhibitory gene that affects alcohol binge behavior

This 2015 La Jolla rodent study found that an inhibitory gene affected alcohol binging behavior:

“Our study reveals the behavioral impact of this cellular effect, whereby the level of GIRK3 [the gene] expression in the VTA [ventral tegmental area] tunes ethanol intake under binge-type conditions: the more GIRK3, the less ethanol drinking.”

GIRK3-silenced mice still binged, though, and got alcohol’s rewarding effects through dopamine’s other neural pathways.

High concentrations of the gene were found in the thalamus part of the limbic system of wild-type mice, the control group. Per the study’s title, this gene presumably contributes to the thalamus’ overall function of gating information from limbic system and lower brain areas to reach the cerebrum and vice versa.

And the potential causes for reduced GIRK3 expression are..?? Hopefully – someday – researchers will be focused on finding causes for abnormal gene expression rather than being content to just study effects of abnormal gene expression. Until then, the usual practice of considering only the effects led these researchers to:

“Believe that a compound selectively targeting GIRK3-containing channels may hold promise for reducing alcohol consumption in heavy binge drinkers.”

http://www.pnas.org/content/112/22/7091.full “GIRK3 gates activation of the mesolimbic dopaminergic pathway by ethanol”

One way beliefs produce pleasure and reward in the cerebrum

This 2014 Singapore human study found:

“Differences in belief learning – the degree to which players were able to anticipate and respond to the actions of others, or to imagine what their competitor is thinking and respond strategically – was associated with variation in three genes which primarily affect dopamine functioning in the medial prefrontal cortex.

In contrast, differences in trial-and-error reinforcement learning – how quickly they forget past experiences and how quickly they change strategy – was associated with variation in two genes that primarily affect striatal dopamine.”

One of the researchers said:

“The findings correlate well with previous brain studies showing that the prefrontal cortex is involved in belief learning, while the striatum is involved in reinforcement learning.”

The study didn’t demonstrate cause and effect, however, and the researchers cautioned:

“It would be mistaken to interpret our results as suggesting that dopamine genes function as “belief learning genes.”

The study added to the science of how beliefs act on the pleasure and reward parts of the cerebrum.

http://www.pnas.org/content/111/26/9615.full.pdf “Dissociable contribution of prefrontal and striatal dopaminergic genes to learning in economic games” (the pdf file is linked because the html had errors)

Do you know a stranger’s emotional motivations for smiling?

The premise of this combination of two studies was:

“Emotional understanding is the central problem of human interaction.”

The researchers reanalyzed a 2008 study’s data, supplemented it with their own 2015 study, and found:

“Social-historical factors..explain cross-cultural variation in emotional expression and smile behavior.

We also report an original study of the underlying states that people believe [my emphasis] are signified by a smile.”

The researchers presented the subjects with a survey that asked them to rate 15 possible reasons for a person to smile at them on a seven-point scale of -3 to +3 for disagreeing/agreeing.

The research methodology didn’t take the additional necessary steps of establishing paired experiments that included presenting a similar survey to a control group of subjects to self-report their emotional motivations for smiling, and then processing the two surveys.

Did the study’s reviewer have anything to say about this lack of validation of the subjects’ beliefs to any factual measurements of a stranger’s corresponding “emotional expression and smile behavior?”

This combination of studies didn’t inform us about the “emotional understanding is the central problem of human interaction” premise. The researchers only provided evidence that the subjects’ cultures were one of many causal factors for the subjects’ beliefs about a hypothetical stranger’s smiling behavior.

The combined studies didn’t contain any emotional content to establish experimental conditions toward the goal of “emotional understanding.” No emotions were involved, for example, when a subject rated “strongly agree” to the “Wants you to like them” reason on a survey for a hypothetical stranger’s smiling behavior.

The studies didn’t show that the subjects rating their beliefs contributed to their real “emotional understanding.” Including emotional content, such as experimentally evoking an actual emotion in response to an actual stranger smiling, possibly could have contributed to real “emotional understanding.

Research that strips out emotional content can’t factually provide evidence for real “emotional expression and smile behavior.” The degrees to which beliefs about and perceptions of a stranger’s smiling actually match their emotional reality remain to be shown.

http://www.pnas.org/content/112/19/E2429.full “Heterogeneity of long-history migration explains cultural differences in reports of emotional expressivity and the functions of smiles”

How well can catastrophes be predicted?

This 2015 study found a way of modeling catastrophic shifts that smoothed the processes with selectively introduced randomness:

“Most computer models created for the purpose of predicting catastrophes are based on deterministic math—that is, they assume a perfect world where nothing is random. That approach cannot work in the real world of course, because real catastrophes quite often have several contributing factors that are random in nature.

In real life, such events exhibit another common trait of catastrophes, a group of rapid transitions that come about due to a small change in a system.”

If this study’s findings were correct, it would seem that researchers who put together models that used deterministic algorithms to predict catastrophes may have been just expressing their beliefs instead of assessing reality.

There apparently are many researchers whose models incorporate catastrophes. A search on PNAS.org for “catastrophic” shows over 100 studies published since the beginning of last year.


In a related question: Does everything happen for a reason?

  • If randomness is included as a reason, maybe things do.
  • If randomness is excluded, then we’re back to beliefs instead of reality.

In perhaps an unrelated question: Can catastrophes be predictably avoided in our personal lives?

  • Maybe most of them can, if we can eliminate sources of potential harm.
  • Probably not entirely avoided, though, because of the randomness factor.

It’s difficult to have a balanced degree of concern about future harm. Here’s a view from Dr. Arthur Janov in his Primal Healing book p. 70:

“Worrying is not a problem, it is the symptom of something that is occurring physiologically within the brain. What causes the worrying is the problem.

Constant worry is anticipating catastrophe. But what we don’t realize is that the catastrophe already has happened; we simply have no access to it.

We are actually worried about the past, not the future.”

http://www.pnas.org/content/112/15/E1828.full “Eluding catastrophic shifts”


This post has somehow become a target for spammers, and I’ve disabled comments. Readers can comment on other posts and indicate that they want their comment to apply here, and I’ll re-enable comments.

The amygdala part of the limbic system doesn’t process beliefs

Does your desk light switch on or off when other people in the office switch their desk lights on or off? Something in the wiring would probably be wrong if it did.

And wouldn’t you expect that other desk lights would still operate normally if your desk light’s bulb burned out, although everyone may be plugged into the same electrical circuit?


It surprised the researchers of this 2015 CalTech/MIT study when:

“Two patients with bilateral amygdala lesions performed a belief reasoning test.

Both patients showed typical test performance and cortical activity when compared with nearly 500 healthy controls.”

The study’s overall frame of reference was expressed as:

“Humans use a so-called “theory-of-mind” to reason about the beliefs of others. Neuroimaging studies of belief reasoning suggest it activates a specific cortical network. The amygdala is interconnected with this network and plays a fundamental role in social behavior.”

The experimental test:

“Was designed to optimize functional contrast in those brain regions thought to be involved in attempts, be they successful or unsuccessful, to evaluate the veracity of another person’s belief about the world.”


A “belief reasoning test..to reason about the beliefs of others” is a cerebral exercise. The amygdala, in contrast, is an emotional center of a person’s limbic system.

The logic by which the study may be viewed is:

  1. The “belief reasoning test” had no emotional content to activate the subjects’ amygdalae.
  2. fMRI scans confirmed that limbic system areas in the 2 lesioned subjects weren’t activated during the test.
  3. Apply the logic of Occam’s razor, and we arrive at the findings of “typical test performance and cortical activity.”

Task performance and beliefs about task responses are solely cerebral exercises had a similar methodology and result in that those subjects’ limbic systems were monitored during fMRI scans and subsequent reporting, but the subjects’ limbic system areas weren’t activated during any of the experiments.


The researchers stated the results:

“Suggest a reevaluation of the role of the amygdala and its cortical interactions in human social cognition.”

But per the beginning analogy – if your desk light’s bulb burned out, would you be surprised that it didn’t affect the normal operations of desk lights in other offices, although they all may be plugged into the same circuit?

This study informed us that the amygdala isn’t slaved to the cerebrum. It’s hard to change the current research mindset/social meme of cerebral dominance, though, so maybe this information will be overlooked.

http://www.pnas.org/content/112/15/4827.full “Amygdala lesions do not compromise the cortical network for false-belief reasoning”

Can you give emotionally informed yet reasoned responses to moral questions within 3 seconds?

Could you give a 3-second informed decision that reflected your true feelings about this statement?

“Inflicting emotional harm is just as bad as inflicting physical harm.”

Could you then express your confidence about your answer on a 1-7 scale within 1 second? How about your 3-second response to this statement:

“Developing a child’s character is central to raising it good.”

The researchers of this 2015 Swedish study asserted that it:

“Demonstrates that moral choices are no different from their preferential and perceptual counterparts; they are highly constrained and coupled to the immediate environment through sensory interaction.”

The subjects’ moral choices about statements such as:

“One should never intentionally harm another person.”

weren’t weighted any differently than their “top of the head” answers to questions such as:

“Is Denmark larger than Sweden?”

There was a time limit of 3 seconds for the subjects to answer 63 “moral” and 35 “factual” questions. The subjects were asked to express their confidence in the answer during an additional 1-second time frame. Answers after these time limits were discarded.

In the supplementary material, the researchers:

“Justified our design. When no time-out condition was included, 33% of participants realized that their eye movements were influencing the timing of the trial.”

So the 3-second time frame was imposed to keep the subjects from gaming the experiment. The experiment’s time limit of 3 seconds didn’t have anything to do with properly modeling moral decision-making.


The time period wasn’t the only questionable area. The researchers focused on eye gaze as the important homogenous factor influencing the subjects as they made their “moral” choices.

However, one person’s eye gaze is not necessarily the same as the next person’s, as demonstrated by studies such as:

An individual’s attention and perception that are incorporated into their eye gaze are behaviors that may have many differing historical components. For example, one subject may have kept their gaze on the:

“Value animals equally.”

answer to the:

“Animal welfare should not be valued equally with human welfare.”

question because their initial reaction involved their cuddly pet. Another subject may have kept their gaze on the same answer because their initial reaction involved a stray dog that attacked them.


Did the study shed light on its initial statement?

“Moral cognition arises from the interplay between emotion and reason.”

I didn’t see that the study’s design allowed its subjects to produce emotionally informed yet reasoned responses to the 98-question battery.


http://www.pnas.org/content/112/13/4170.full “Biasing moral decisions by exploiting the dynamics of eye gaze”

Why do we cut short our decision-making process?

This 2014 Zurich study found that people adapt their goal-directed decision-making processes in certain ways.

First, the researchers found that the subjects usually acted as though the computational cost of evaluating all outcomes became too high once the process expanded to three or more levels. Their approach to a goal involved developing subgoals. For example, for a three-level goal:

“Level 3 was most frequently decomposed into a tree of depth 2 followed by a depth-1 tree.”

A level 3 tree had 24 potential outcomes (24 outcomes = 3*2x2x2) whereas a level 2 tree followed by a level 1 tree had 10 potential outcomes (10 outcomes = 2*2×2 + 1*2).

Second, the subjects memorized and reused subgoals after their initial formation. The researchers found that this practice didn’t produce results significantly different than the optimal solutions, but that could have been due to the study’s particular design. The design also ensured that the subjects’ use of subgoals wasn’t influenced by rewards.

Further:

“It is known that nonhuman primate choices, for instance, depend substantially on their own past choices, above and beyond the rewards associated with the decisions. Similar arguments have been made for human choices in a variety of tasks and settings and have been argued to be under dopaminergic and serotonergic control.”

Third, ALL 37 subjects were unwilling to evaluate decisions that had initial large losses, even if they could see that the path to reach the optimal solution went through this loss outcome! The researchers termed this behavior “pruning” and stated:

“Pruning is a Pavlovian and reflexive response to aversive outcomes.”

The lead author relied on a previous study he coauthored to elaborate on the third finding. One statement in the previous study was:

“This theory predicts excessive pruning to occur in subjects at risk for depression, and reduced pruning to occur during a depressive episode.”

The current study’s subjects were screened out for depressive conditions, though. They were somewhat conditioned by the study design, but not to the extent where their behavior could be characterized as Pavlovian responses.

Fourth, the subjects’ use of larger subgoals wasn’t correlated to their verbal IQ.


So, what can we make of this research?

  1. Are shortcuts to our decision processes strictly a cerebral exercise per the first and second findings?
  2. Do we recycle our decision shortcuts like our primate relatives, uninfluenced by current rewards?
  3. Or is it rewarding to just not fully evaluate all of our alternatives?
  4. Do all of us always back away from decisions involving an initial painful loss, even when we may see the possibility of gaining a better outcome by persevering through the loss?
  5. Is it true that we excessively cut decision processes too short – such that many of our decisions are suboptimal – when we’re on our way to becoming depressed?
  6. Are we overwhelmed when depressed such that we don’t summon up the effort to cut short or otherwise evaluate decisional input?

Let me know your point of view.

http://www.pnas.org/content/112/10/3098.full “Interplay of approximate planning strategies”

How do we assess “importance” in our lives? An example from scientists’ research choices

This 2015 Virginia study found that scientists preferred research projects that had the potential to make:

“Deeper vs. broader contributions.

The scientists surveyed considered a hypothetical broader study, compared with an otherwise-comparable deeper study, to be riskier, a less-significant opportunity, and of lower potential importance.”

What were underlying motivations for subject scientists to become the Big Frogs in tiny puddles?

For example, if scientists recognized that there was an opportunity to positively influence a great number of human lives with a “broader” study, such as the hunger research proposed in Do the impacts of early experiences of hunger affect our behavior, thoughts, and feelings today? why would they prefer a “deeper” study such as starving fruit flies?


These researchers said that “scientists’ personal dispositions” accounted for this finding. I agree, but not for any of the specific reasons they stated.

Subjects’ “lower potential importance” judgments were key, and bear closer examination. The study’s supplementary material showed this consideration was made on a sliding scale in response to a question:

“Would you describe Project A (B) as potentially very important?”

The “lower potential importance” finding was an accumulation of each scientist’s personal judgment of a project described as:

“A broad project that spans several topical domains, including at least one that coincides with your area(s) of expertise and interest.

compared with:

“A focused and specialized project that fits your particular interests and leverages your deep expertise in a specific area.”

Weren’t personal judgments of the hypothetical project’s “potentially very important” aspect how each scientist predicted the project would make them feel important?

Given vague project descriptions in above quotations, I assert that their judgments’ contexts were “important to me” rather than “important to science” or “important to society” or important to some other context.


A relevant hypothesis of Dr. Arthur Janov’s Primal Therapy that applies to the “lower potential importance” finding is: the need to feel important is a defense against feeling unimportant due to early experiences of neglect.

Using principles referenced in the hunger post, the need to feel important is:

  1. A derivative need;
  2. A substitute for an unfulfilled need; and
  3. Caused by the impact of an early unmet need.

A corollary is that if an infant didn’t have early experiences of neglect, and their early needs were met, they likely wouldn’t develop derivative needs such as the need to feel important as they progressed through childhood, adolescence, and adulthood.

Are people motivated to act like the scientists who were subjects of this study? Do we make career and personal choices based on whether or not our work and other people make us feel important?

See my Welcome page and Scientific evidence page for further elaborations of this topic.

http://www.pnas.org/content/112/12/3653.full “Different personal propensities among scientists relate to deeper vs. broader knowledge contributions”

An agenda-driven study on beliefs, smoking and addiction that found nothing of substance

The researchers of this 2014 Virginia Tech study said that they found something profound about beliefs and the brain and addiction and smoking.


I’ll assert the short versions of some relevant understandings before assessing the study.

1) A principle of Dr. Arthur Janov’s Primal Therapy is: we all have needs that start at the beginning of our lives. Our needs change as we grow.

If our basic needs aren’t satisfied anywhere along the way, we feel pain.

When the unmet needs are early in our lives and the painful conditions persist, enduring physiological changes may occur.

This basic truth is supported by the findings of much of the recent research I’ve curated on this blog, the references in those studies, and older research elsewhere.

2) Another fundamental of Primal Therapy is that the physiological impacts of these unmet needs drive our behavior, thoughts, and feelings.

The painful impacts of our unfulfilled needs impel us to be constantly vigilant for some way to fulfill them.

This is a richly insightful and truly empathetic method of interpreting people’s behaviors and expressions of thoughts and feelings.

3) A hypothesis of Primal Therapy is: a major function that our cerebrums have evolutionarily adapted is to use ideas and beliefs to repress pain and make us more comfortable.

I value this inference as an empathetic method of interpreting people’s expressions of thoughts and feelings. Click the Beliefs category to view samples of how beliefs, expectations, and predictions are studied using cerebral measurements.


So – what did this study contribute to science about beliefs and the underlying causes of addiction and smoking as found by measuring the subjects’ brains?

Nothing new, really. The study was all about the effects, the symptoms. There was nothing about:

  • Impelling physical conditions and causes,
  • What primarily drives people’s beliefs and addiction behaviors, and
  • What may permanently help someone with their need for the next cigarette.

I wonder what the study’s reviewer saw that factually advanced science.

Everybody already knew that beliefs can temporarily substitute for addicting substances, as well as temporarily change behaviors. It’s a foundation of AA and detox centers.

It’s also a foundation of AA and detox centers that these beliefs have to be constantly reinforced. That fact in and of itself demonstrates that underlying causes aren’t addressed in the AA and detox center approaches. The symptoms always bubble up, and require thought remedies and other interventions in order to stay suppressed.


The research provided details about an approach that wasn’t capable of anything more than temporarily suppressing symptoms. What does the following quote from the Significance statement sound like to you?

“Our findings suggest that subjective beliefs can override the physical presence of a powerful drug like nicotine by modulating learning signals processed in the brain’s reward system.”

Any human therapeutic approach won’t supply the addicting substance. That leaves just beliefs and their required constant reinforcement.

The unsupported overconfidence of the researchers that:

“The implications of these findings may be far ranging”

led to one of the most ridiculous statements I’ve seen in a while:

“Just as drugs micromanage the belief state,” Montague said, “maybe we can micromanage beliefs to better effect behavior change in addiction.”

This hubris just added to the stench of an agenda.

Since smoking isn’t politically correct, I’d guess that it wasn’t that difficult for this study to be funded and promoted. It apparently wasn’t an obstacle that the research DETRACTED from science and didn’t really help people.

http://www.pnas.org/content/112/8/2539.full “Belief about nicotine selectively modulates value and reward prediction error signals in smokers”

Research on brain areas involved when we imagine people, places, and pleasantness

This highly jargoned 2014 Harvard study was on how people imagine that they’ll feel in the future.

One of the researchers was an author of:

I was surprised that this study also didn’t ignore the limbic system to the point to where the researchers wouldn’t even bother to measure important areas.

Limbic system areas that process people were different than those that process places. For example, the data in Table S4 showed that the subjects’ left amygdala and hippocampus were more activated when simulating future familiar people, whereas their right hippocampus was more activated when simulating future familiar places.


The researchers may have improved the study’s findings if they were informed by studies such as the Hippocampus replays memories and preplays to extend memories into future scenarios, which found that “place” cells in the CA1 segment of the hippocampus preplay events that imagine future scenarios of:

“Novel spatial experiences of similar distinctiveness and complexity.”

Such information may have helped to disambiguate one of the study’s findings in Table S5, that both sides of the subjects’ hippocampus were more activated than other brain regions when simulating both familiar people and places.


The researchers got a little carried away in broadly attributing most of the study’s findings to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. For example, the data in Table S6 showed that the thalamus was more activated when the subjects anticipated positive pleasantness, but not when negative effects were anticipated.

We know from Thalamus gating and control of the limbic system and cerebrum is a form of memory that this is normally how the thalamus part of the limbic system actively controls and gates information to and from the cerebrum. Their data showed thalamic gating in operation:

  • Active when passing along pleasantness to cerebral areas, and
  • Passive when blocking unpleasantness from cerebral areas.

Also, I didn’t see how the researchers differentiated some of their findings from a placebo effect. For example, Using expectations of oxytocin to induce positive placebo effects of touching is a cerebral exercise found:

“Pain reduction dampened sensory processing in the brain, whereas increased touch pleasantness increased sensory processing.”

This was very similar to the above finding involving the thalamus.

http://www.pnas.org/content/111/46/16550.full “Ventromedial prefrontal cortex supports affective future simulation by integrating distributed knowledge”

Our cerebrums use ideas and beliefs to repress pain and make us more comfortable

One hypothesis of Primal Therapy is that a major function our cerebrums have evolutionarily adapted is to use ideas and beliefs to repress pain and make us more comfortable.

Is it any wonder why this 2014 study found:

“Beliefs are more prevalent among societies that inhabit poorer environments and are more prone to ecological duress.”

http://www.pnas.org/content/111/47/16784.full “The ecology of religious beliefs”

If a study didn’t measure feelings, then its findings may not pertain to genuine empathy

This 2014 UK study tried to show that empathetic actions were very context-dependent. It mainly studied causing overt pain to another person.

The lead researcher stated:

“We were interested in quantifying how much people care about others, relative to themselves. A lack of concern for others’ suffering lies at the heart of many psychiatric disorders such as psychopathy, so developing precise laboratory measures of empathy and altruism will be important for probing the brain processes that underlie antisocial behavior.”

The researchers didn’t provide direct evidence of genuine empathy – the subjects’ emotions of sensing and sharing the emotions of another person.

The study was designed to cause sensations of pain and draw conclusions about empathetic feelings. The subjects’ limbic system and lower brains were never measured, however.

Why did the researchers decide to only infer these feelings and sensations from actions and reports? Why wasn’t this inferred evidence confirmed with direct measurements of the brain areas that primarily process feelings and sensations?


  1. At no time during the experiment did the subjects see or hear or touch the person whom they caused pain. Wouldn’t it be difficult for the subjects to feel authentic empathy for a disembodied presence?
  2. We’re informed by the Task performance and beliefs about task responses are solely cerebral exercises study that it’s inaccurate to characterize subjects’ task responses as feelings.
  3. We know from the Problematic research: If you don’t feel empathy for a patient, is the solution to fake it? study that people’s cerebrums are easily capable of generating a proxy for empathy.

This study’s findings concerning empathy involved inauthentic empathy – the non-feeling, cerebral exercise, faking-it kind.

http://www.pnas.org/content/111/48/17320.full “Harm to others outweighs harm to self in moral decision making”